I have been mulling this over for a bit on the unused neurons in my noggin...
For first order I think the BMS should:
- signal the controller to stop during a LVC event
- signal the charger to stop during a HVC event
In other words the controller and the charger should be able to accept an "arm" command from the BMS. Without the "arm" command, the "fire" command (twisting the throttle) or (providing charge) should be disabled. Simple, low voltage and current signal path.
A fuse should be integral to the battery pack for safety.
Now we have to think of second order safety effects. For a brushed motor, if the controller FETs fuse (short) we can have a run away at full power. Hence I think a contactor is required in the battery pack to provide propulsive power cut off. It is signaled the same way, with an "arm" command from the controller.
Now what safety shuts offs are required for 3P BLDC motors? We should discuss this and the known controller failure modes. Like twist throttle failures resulting in "full forward" commands. Could be handled with a contactor, or could have another layer of low voltage "arm" signals in the controller from say an accessible key switch to enable the PWM circuitry.
We should think this all through and evolve to a 21st century "system topology" for a high powered eBike.
Also a topological recommendation from now defunct A123. They required that if you had a microprocessor in the mix for a "smart" BMS, that there needed to be another, hardware only, redline BMS that was redundant and could shut things down if the micro hung/failed. Both TI and Maxim make chips that do this function in hardware.
This discussion would center around the "Failure Tolerance" of the BMS. In the A123 example above, they are recommending single failure tolerance. What is prudent on a high powered eBike?