furcifer said:
Again yes. The back-ups were located below the identified potential water level and they got wet. It's really as simple as that.
No, it's really not.
The tsunami disabled the off-site grid power connection, 5 of the 6 emergency diesel generators, the switchgear below the reactors and the RHR (residual heat removal) loops; they were seawater cooled. Batteries kept the reactor emergency pumps running for a day. Once that power ran out, reactors 1-3 overheated.
The one remaining diesel generator was sufficient to power the residual heat removal loop pumps for reactors 5 and 6 (specifically their spent cooling pools.) Thus they were not damaged.
Even if the switchgear was 100% intact, the lack of energy would have meant that reactors 1, 2 and 3 would not have had power. The same thing would have happened even if the switchgear was 100% intact. There was no way for the one remaining generator to power all 6 pumps, nor did the switchgear allow that.
Nor was the switchgear disabled by "a drop of water" - hundreds of thousands of gallons flooded the basements of both the turbine building and the common spent fuel pool building where the switchgear was located. It is also notable that much of the switchgear continued to work even after being flooded; the batteries, for example, were in the basement and were routed through the switchgear. But hundreds of thousands of gallons of seawater meant that (for example) no one was going to go down there to try to hotwire the one remaining generator to run the other RHR pumps.
It's not directly responsible and of course you couldn't create a meltdown by pouring a bucket of water on them, but it's a pretty good example of how human error in an of itself can be a problem. Assuming someone couldn't deliberately expose simple vulnerabilities, if properly motivated, does seem a bit foolish all things considered.
The big mistake - the "human error" if you will - was not designing for a ~15 meter tsunami.